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AN ANALYSIS OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE 
USE OF AN INCOME EQUALISATION DEPOSIT SCHEME 
BY COMMERCIAL FARMERS IN SOUTH AFRICA1 
 






Recent research suggests that an Income Equalisation Deposit (IED) scheme could be 
a feasible new risk management tool for commercial farmers in South Africa. This 
prompted a study of practicing consultants’ (tax experts) views on determining what 
types of farmers would be likely to use the scheme. During 2000, a postal survey of 24 
consultants was conducted mainly in KwaZulu-Natal, and in the Maize Triangle and 
surrounding areas. Each consultant was to review nine scenarios (eight plus a 
control, giving 192 observations) and decide whether they would recommend an IED 
scheme for each scenario. A statistical experimental design was used to structure the 
scenarios, allowing for main and interaction effects between variables that could 
influence the potential use of an IED scheme. Discriminant analysis revealed that, 
ceteris paribus, farmers with higher annual net farm incomes (>R300,000), lower 
debt/asset ratios (<15%), more variable net farm incomes, and less off-farm income 
would most likely use an IED scheme.  In terms of ranking, ceteris paribus, high risk 
maize farmers, intermediate risk maize farmers and high risk livestock farmers are 
more likely to use an IED scheme than are low risk maize farmers, low and 
intermediate risk livestock farmers and diversified farmers. These results support the 
use of an IED scheme as a risk management tool as higher risk farmers are more likely 




Farmers operate and make decisions in an uncertain environment 
characterised by business and financial risk (Gabriel & Baker, 1980). More 
variable product prices following agricultural marketing deregulation, 
drought, and more variable nominal interest rates, are recent examples of 
such risks in South Africa. These risks lead to income variability, especially in 
the grain sectors where widespread droughts are common. Past South African 
government response to drought mainly involved providing drought relief, 
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culminating in R3.8 billion worth of assistance - mostly to maize farmers - in 
1992/93 (Willemse, 1992:15). Since 1994, the South African government has 
changed this policy and has encouraged farmers to manage risks themselves, 
in order to reduce demands on government funds. One option currently being 
proposed to the National Department of Agriculture (NDA, 1997) is an 
Income Equalisation Deposit (IED) scheme. An IED could provide a reserve 
fund in which farmers invest part of their income during “good” years, and 
then are taxed on this income only when they withdraw the money for use in 
“bad” years. In this way, the IED would operate as a risk management tool to 
help stabilise farm incomes. 
 
In a progressive income tax structure, taxpayers with fluctuating incomes are 
more likely to have a greater tax liability than taxpayers with relatively stable 
incomes. Thus, taxpayers with comparable incomes over a time period may 
not be treated similarly and tax equity may not be achieved. Because of this, 
South African farmers can elect to be taxed at a rate that is based on a moving 
average income. However, this tax instrument does not promote better cash 
flow and better risk management as the farmer is not provided with 
additional incentives to save in good years and to be better prepared for the 
“lean” years. The drought relief provision (paragraph 13A of the First 
Schedule of the Income Tax Act) provides some drought relief to livestock 
farmers, but no scheme is available to crop farmers who are more vulnerable 
to droughts. 
 
The establishment of an IED scheme is not a new issue in South Africa since it 
was first considered in 1951, put forward again in 1960, and later proposed in 
1979 and 1987 (RSA, 1951; 1979 and 1987). The scheme was seen as a means of 
stabilising farm incomes, acting as a risk management tool. The 
recommendation was rejected in all cases. The government and all 
commissions involved were not convinced of the feasibility of the proposed 
scheme stating it was open to serious objections. Criticisms included (1) it 
leads to tax deferral, (2) the current income averaging scheme also allows 
farmers to provide for poor years via tax savings in good years, and (3) the 
scheme may be misused in conjunction with the current income averaging 
scheme that has an in-out option, to destabilise income and reduce tax 
(Lamont, 1990:410).  
 
More recently, the use of an IED scheme as a tax instrument to promote 
improved cash flow and risk management has been considered by many, 
focusing primarily on the tax implications (Lamont, 1990; NDA, 1997 and 
Fuchs, 1999). Nieuwoudt & Howell (2000), however, perceived that the 
economic feasibility of such a scheme had not been fully researched and the 
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economic environment had changed considerably over the years making the 
scheme more attractive. Most crop insurance schemes had collapsed, 
deregulation had lead to an increase in uncertainty and real interest rates 
became positive creating more of an incentive to save. In light of these events, 
the economic feasibility of introducing an IED scheme in South Africa was 
evaluated by Nieuwoudt & Howell (2000). They suggested that the proposed 
scheme could be feasible in the South African situation, promoting better cash 
flow and risk management over time. This study reports on a postal survey 
which was conducted amongst 24 South African tax consultants (experts) in 
2000. It complements Nieuwoudt and Howell’s study by researching whom 
practicing tax consultants consider as the likely beneficiaries of an IED scheme 
for commercial farmers in South Africa. Discriminant analysis was conducted 
to identify and rank factors that distinguish between potential adopters and 
non-adopters of an IED scheme. 
 
2. BACKGROUND  HISTORY  OF  IED PROPOSALS FOR SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
This section provides an overview of past IED scheme proposals in South 
Africa. 
 
2.1  Past reviews of IED schemes in South Africa 
 
The establishment of an IED scheme in South Africa was initially considered by 
the Steyn Committee in 1951 (RSA, 1951). The Committee recommended 
against its introduction as other forms of the industry were also subjected to 
income variations. In 1960, the De Swart Study Group on Agricultural Credit 
recommended IED’s as a means to counter excessive capital expenditure and 
consequent financial difficulties of farmers. The principle was not accepted. In 
1979, the Jacobs Committee supported IED schemes in principle, but did not 
consider themselves to have the expertise to evaluate the practical implications 
of the proposal (RSA, 1979). The proposal was referred to the Standing 
Commission of Taxation and the Commission for Inland Revenue who found 
the IED scheme was open to serious objections. The government (RSA, 1982) 
accepted the recommendations of the Standing Commission that the scheme be 
rejected. Finally, the Margo Commission recommended against the use of IED’s 
in 1987 (RSA, 1987), commenting that an IED scheme, whether as a complement 
to or a replacement of the current averaging scheme, should not be implemented. 
 
The main advantages of IED schemes in the past were (Lamont, 1990:409; 
RSA, 1987): 
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a)  Stability. Greater stability in the agricultural sector will be promoted, as 
this sector is subject to income and production variations from year to 
year. 
 
b)  Voluntary. Farmers will be able to overcome setbacks and crises on their 
own. 
 
c)  Welfare. If farmers are more able to help themselves, it will reduce the 
dependence on State assistance during adverse rimes. 
 
d) Efficiency. Income fluctuations and bunching of investment expenditure 
will be smoothed. 
 
e)  Administration. If funds are deposited at a bank, the scheme will be easy 
to administer. 
 
Major criticisms of IED schemes in the past are presented below, with 
recommendations provided by Nieuwoudt & Howell (2000): 
 
1)  An IED scheme will favour the rich (Hattingh, 1986) and indications are 
that a small percentage of farmers would be able to use an IED scheme 
(RSA, 1987). 
 
Current deposits in the drought relief scheme for livestock sales 
(paragraph 13A) are estimated at just over R200 million and the number 
of investors has increased three-fold since the Margo Commission 
enquiry. This indicates that deposits will not be insignificant if an IED 
scheme is adopted and caters for both crops and livestock.  
 
2) The scheme impinges on the sound principle that revenue should be 
taxed in the year in which it accrues (RSA, 1987). 
 
Farmers cannot benefit from deferred taxes while the funds are 
deposited as they cannot access these funds. Tax deferral can also be 
limited by specifying a time limit on holding deposits. This principle 
has already been ignored under the drought relief measure provided by 
the Land Bank. 
 
3) There are many other sectors of the economy which suffer vagaries of 
fluctuating markets, sales and income. To make an exception for farming 
would be indefensible if others were refused (Lamont, 1990:409). 
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Agricultural risk has different components, which distinguish it from 
risk in other sectors. The first component is the risk arising from 
adverse weather, which affects vast areas simultaneously. This is 
common in South African agriculture. The second component is the 
severity of the risk when compared to North America and Europe 
where a 30% decline in corn production is seen as a disaster. A decline 
o f  m o r e  t h a n  6 0 %  i n  m a i z e  p r o d uction is not uncommon in South 
Africa. Lastly, the farmer has little control over his environment and 
often has little scope to diversify. This is especially true in the cropping 
areas of South Africa. Other sectors may experience risk, but more 
opportunities are available to spread business risks. 
 
4) Current averaging schemes lend themselves well to enable farmers in 
good years to make provision for poorer years by means of a tax saving 
(Lamont, 1990:409). 
These concessions, [paragraph 15 (3) (plantation farming) and paragraph 
19 (2) (average taxable income) of the First Schedule of the Income Tax 
Act No. 58 of 1962 (Huxham & Haupt, 2000)], provide the farmer with 
some tax relief and removes some of the incentives to overcapitalise in 
“good” years. However, these concessions provide no incentive to the 
farmer to make provision for “bad” years. 
 
5)  An excessively high tax burden could result on the death of a taxpayer 
(RSA, 1987). Since it is only logical that a person cannot continue to be a 
taxpayer after his death, the Income Tax Act requires that a deceased 
person shall be taxed on all income received by or accruing to him up to 
and including the date of his death. The total amount to his credit on 
that date in the proposed reserve fund and not yet taxed, would 
therefore have to be taxed at that stage and, if it was a large amount, an 
excessively high tax burden could result. 
This tax burden has also been ignored as livestock farmers are given the 
same concession under the drought relief measure provided by the 
Land Bank. 
 
6) The scheme offers considerable scope for tax sheltering and can be 
misused. There is nothing preventing a farmer depositing non-farm 
income into IED’s and withdrawing it as  p art  o f  f ar m  i n c o me  ( R S A , 
1987 and Lamont, 1990:410). 
If a rule is applied that no funds may be deposited in an IED scheme if 
current taxable income is below the moving average taxable income, 
misuse of the scheme for tax sheltering purposes could be avoided. 




Nieuwoudt & Howell (2000) emphasized two determining factors pertaining 
to the feasibility of introducing an IED scheme in South Africa. One factor, 
briefly discussed in the criticisms, relates to the misuse of an IED scheme and 
the second factor relates to the implementation of an IED scheme. 
 
If far mer s  have acc ess to bot h an in-o ut tax provision (whereby, in a year 
when current farm income is below the moving average, farmers who elect 
income averaging are taxed on the current income at a rate that corresponds 
to that income, rather than the higher rate derived from averaging) and an 
IED scheme, they may use the scheme to deliberately destabilise income to 
obtain tax advantages. The problem arises when funds are deposited in low-
income years to bring down the tax rate even further. This practice could be 
avoided by enforcing a rule that funds cannot be deposited in an IED scheme 
in the current year if actual taxable income in that year is below the moving 
average taxable income. This rule would require no additional information for 
tax purposes as the current income averaging concession uses information on 
both average and current taxable income (Nieuwoudt & Howell, 2000). 
 
It may be possible to replace the livestock drought relief scheme (paragraph 
13A, that allows livestock farmers to deposit income from the forced sales 
with the Land Bank and only be taxed on withdrawal of the funds) with an 
IED scheme and have one scheme that caters for both livestock and crop 
farmers. This implies that deposits can be made only if current taxable income 
is above the moving average taxable income. This will still allow livestock 
farmers to make deposits into this fund during drought conditions as incomes 
will be above the moving average (Nieuwoudt & Howell, 2000). 
 
Internationally, use is being made of schemes similar to the proposed IED 
acting as risk management tools. These schemes are designed to help 
producers deal with uneven income streams by stabilising their farming 
income. The Australian scheme, which operates in a similar way to the 
proposed IED scheme, will briefly be discussed. 
 
2.2  Present (2000) IED provisions in Australia 
 
The Australian Government introduced IED’s in 1976 with the aim of 
encouraging farmers to stabilise their incomes. They were intended to provide 
farmers with a “self-help” means of handling income instability. Besides the 
small usage, a number of developments reduced the attractiveness of IED’s, 
which resulted in the introduction of a new scheme in 1983. The new scheme 
was intended to provide an incentive for farmers to set aside in good years 
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money for use in bad years. The introduction of the in-out option and the 
lifting of the deposit limit had a number of consequences, which contributed 
to the repeal of the IED scheme. Reasons for the repeal will be discussed. 
 
1)  The interaction of the averaging scheme and the IED scheme produced 
anomalous results whereby a tax benefit could be gained by farmers 
deliberately destabilising their taxable income by lodging deposits in 
low-income years and withdraw them in high income years (RSA, 1987; 
Lamont, 1990:369). 
 
2) Since monies deposited in the IED scheme could be derived from any 
source (other than investment income), methods existed that enabled 
some weaknesses in the averaging scheme to be exploited. 
 
The present IED scheme in Australia is called a Farm Management Deposit 
Scheme (FMD). FMD’s have the same purpose as IED schemes, namely to 
encourage farmers to save money in “good” years for use in “bad” years. 
FMD’s provide an important risk management tool to help farmers deal with 
uneven income streams common in Australian agriculture due to climate and 
market risks. Deposits into an FMD are not regarded as taxable income in the 
year of deposit, but are taxable when money is withdrawn. FMD’s provide a 
tax linked savings tool for farmers, which can complement other risk 
management strategies such as forward selling and futures contracts. Deposits 
can be made at a financial institution that meets the government’s prudential 
requirements and interest is paid at the commercial rate offered by the 
institution. On withdrawal, a tax is deducted at marginal rates. It is expected 
that the scheme will result in an increase in savings levels by farmers, at the 
same time reducing the tendency to financially over-gear farming operations. 
It is also expected that farmers holding deposits in FMD’s will be regarded as 
having better risk profiles, which could have a beneficial impact on borrowing 
costs. Significant tax savings from the use of FMD’s may be comparatively 
rare (Neilson, 1999:3-4). 
 
3. RESEARCH  METHODOLOGY 
 
A pilot survey was conducted with two consultants from different accounting 
firms to confirm the clarity and realism of the questions and the scenarios 
before the survey was posted to participating consultants. Consultants were 
approached as they deal directly with farmers, and farmers will most likely 
rely on their advice. Fifty-two consultants based mainly in KwaZulu-Natal 
(KZN), and in the Maize Triangle and surrounding areas (North-West 
Province, North-Eastern Free State and Mpumalanga), were surveyed. These 
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areas were selected to obtain the views of consultants that dealt with tax 
matters for a range of farm situations, from relatively low risk livestock and 
diversified farmers in KZN (less variable net farm incomes), to relatively high 
risk maize farmers (more variable net farm incomes) in the Maize Triangle 
and adjacent regions. Discriminant analysis was conducted on data collected 
to determine which explanatory variables best differentiate between potential 
adopters and non-adopters of an IED scheme. 
 
The respondents were divided into the following strata: 
 
Table  1:  Strata of consultants (tax experts)  who reported on the potential 
viability of an IED scheme, 2000 (n=24) 
 
  Consulting Firms  Accounting Firms  University Lecturer  Total 
Maize Triangle  5  4  -  9 
KZN 5  4  -  9 
Bloemfontein 2  1  - 3 
Ficksburg 2  -  -  2 
Cape Town  -  -  1  1 
Total 14  9  1  24 
 
3.1  Experimental design and scenarios 
 
The scenarios were compiled to determine what types of farmers are most 
likely to use an IED scheme. Each consultant was asked to review nine 
scenarios of typical farms in the study regions and to decide whether they 
would recommend an IED scheme for each scenario. Scenarios one to eight 
used in the analyses were constructed using a statistical experimental design, 
with the ninth scenario serving as a control to measure the consistency 
between consultants. These scenarios (farms) were depicted using four 
variables that showed different levels (high, low and intermediate) of farm 
business leverage (debt/asset ratio), net farm income, business risk (net farm 
income variability), and off-farm income, based on representative livestock, 
maize and diversified farm record data supplied by the NDA (1999). 
 
Debt/asset ratios ranged from under 15% to over 40%, while net farm income 
ranged from a low of less than R50,000 per annum to a high of over R300,000 
per annum. Net farm income was defined as gross farm income less farm 
operating costs, excluding any rent, management salary and interest on debt 
(foreign factor costs). Net farm income variability was used as a measure of 
risk. For construction of the scenarios, net farm income variability was 
measured as an index of net farm income variability. This index was shown 
for each year during 1995-1999 by expressing annual net farm income in each 
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year as a percentage of the average net farm income over the five-year period. 
In this way, the index for high risk (high net farm income variability) maize 
farmers (ranging from -30 to 276 around a mean of 100) showed far more net 
farm income variability than the index for low risk livestock farmers (ranging 
from 58 to 124 around a mean of 100). Annual off-farm incomes typically 
ranged from zero to a high of over R20,000 on the study area farms. 
 
The high, low and intermediate values of the four variables used in the survey 
are depicted below in Table 2. 
 
Table 2:  Respective values of variables used in the scenarios 
 
Variable  High   Low  Intermediate 
Debt/Asset ratio  > 40%  < 15%  30% 
Annual off-farm income  > R  20 000  0  R  10 000 
Annual net farm income  > R300 000  < R50 000  R175 000 
Index of variation in NFI 
1995  28  58  119 
1996  201  116  89 
1997  -30  124  111 
1998  276  91  83 
1999  25  111  97 
 
To enhance the simplicity of the survey, livestock net farm income variability 
was depicted using a typical livestock farmer with a low index of net farm 
income variability. Likewise, maize net farm income variability was depicted 
using a typical maize farmer with a high index of net farm income variability. 
For analysis purposes, in order to cover all combinations of net farm income 
variability with farming type, other than livestock and maize farmers with 
low and high levels of net farm income variability respectively, the coefficient 
of variation in net farm income variability was calculated using the original 
representative livestock, maize and diversified farm record data supplied by 
the NDA (1999). In the analysis, high net farm income variability for a maize 
farmer was measured using an index of net farm income variability but coded 
according to its coefficient of variation of net farm income. Likewise, low net 
farm income variability for a livestock farmer was measured using an index in 
net farm income variability, but coded according to its coefficient of variation 
in net farm income. The function obtained separating potential IED scheme 
adopters from non-adopters could then be used to determine the outcome of 
different enterprise combinations with various levels of debt, off-farm income 
and net farm income. 
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Thus, for survey purposes, risk was measured in terms of an index in net farm 
income variation. For analysis purposes, risk was measured as an index of net 
farm income variability, but coded according to the coefficient of variation in 
net farm income in order to determine the function and to exploit all possible 
combinations of net farm income variability with farming type. 
Coefficients of variation calculated for selected enterprise and net farm 
income variability combinations are presented in Table 4. 
 
Table  3: Coefficients of variation calculated for selected enterprise and 
business risk combinations, data extrapolated from farm financial 
records supplied by the NDA, 1999 
 
Enterprise combination  Coefficient of variation 
Maize farmer - high net farm income variability  2.630 
Livestock farmer – high net farm income variability  1.886 
Maize farmer – intermediate net farm income variability  1.963 
Livestock farmer – intermediate net farm income variability  0.947 
Maize farmer - low net farm income variability  1.453 
Livestock farmer – low net farm income variability  0.523 
Diversified farmer  0.303 
 
The scenarios to each consultant were constructed using the 25 factorial 
treatment set as presented by Cochran & Cox (1957:235). There were 32 
different combinations for the five different variables under consideration, 
each at two levels. These variables were: 
A =  Debt/asset ratio (low or high) 
B =  Annual off-farm income (low or high) 
C =  Annual net farm income (low or high) 
D =  Index of variation in net farm income (low or high) 
E =  Type of farming (livestock vs maize) 
 
Three replications of the design were considered with four blocks (consultants) 
per replication. In other words, each consultant was presented with a set of 
eight different “financial record scenarios” with the set of scenarios (blocks) 
being different for each consultant. The choice of a block size of eight permitted 
the partial confounding of 3-factor and 4-factor interactions with different 
effects being confounded in each replication. The confounded effects in each of 
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Table 4:  Confounded effects over three replications 
 
Replication  Effects confounded in each replication 
I ABC,  ADE,  BCDE 
II ABD,  BCE,  ACDE 
III  ACE, BCE, ABDE 
 
By partially confounding 3-factor and 4-factor interactions, it was assumed 
that such interactions would be less important than “main effects” and “2-
factor” interactions. By presenting each consultant with a different set of 
“financial record combinations”, considered “blocks” in experimental design 
terminology, possible differences between blocks (consultants) could be 
eliminated statistically in the subsequent analyses. Halfway through the study 
it became apparent that more data was required to separate the product effect 
(maize or livestock) from the risk effect. It is to be noted that as additional 
consultants became available the sets of questionnaires were repeated, with 
four consultants per replication. The desired response was to cover all sets at 
least once (12 responses). If additional responses were received, it would be 
optimal to cover all sets completely i.e. 12 responses to 24 responses to 36 
responses etc. 
 
Analysis of the original data showed that the blocking effect of the design was 
not necessary and therefore could be analysed as a simple random design 
based on the 25 factorial treatment factor. In the analysis of the augmented 
data the design structure was ignored. 
 
3.2  Econometric technique employed in the empirical analysis 
 
One econometric technique was employed in the data analysis. Discriminant 
models were estimated to determine which explanatory variables best 
differentiate between potential adopters and non-adopters of an IED scheme. 
The object of this multivariate analysis was to generate information for policy 
purposes. This section provides a brief overview of the technique followed by 
an explanation of the variables considered in the models. 
 
3.2.1 Discriminant  analysis 
 
Discriminant analysis is a statistical technique used to predict group 
membership. Linear combinations of the independent, or predictor, variables are 
formed and serve as the basis for grouping cases. In order to distinguish between 
these groups, the researcher must assemble a set of explanatory or discriminating 
variables on which the two groups are expected to differ. On selecting the 
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discriminating variables, the mathematical objective is to weight and linearly 
combine the variables so that the groups are forced to be as statistically distinct 
from one another as possible (Klecka, 1980:7; Norusis, 1994:1). 
 
The discriminant function is of the form: 
Di = B1X1 + B2X2 + ...+ BpXp  (1) 
Where: 
Di is the i-th respondent’s discriminant score on the function 
X1 ...Xp are the values of the independent variables 
B1 ...Bp are standardised coefficients estimated from the data 
 
The coefficients are computed so as to maximise the ratio of the variance of D 
between the two groups relative to the variance of D within groups. The index 
D is an optimum linear discriminator between the groups. The relative 
contribution of each discriminating variable to the discriminating function is 
determined by the magnitude of its associated coefficient. The standardised 
coefficients (Bp) reflect the relative importance of the independent variable 
(Xp). Independent variables with relatively large (Bp) contribute most to the 
discrimination between the two groups (Klecka, 1980:15-16; Norusis, 1994:7). 
The sign of the coefficient indicates whether the variable is positively or 
negatively related to D. 
 
Upon the estimation of the discriminant function it is necessary to assess its 
discriminating power. There are a number of statistics available for this 
estimation with the most important being the eigenvalue, Wilks’ Lambda, 
Chi-square, canonical correlation and F-statistic. The eigenvalue is a direct 
measure of the function’s discriminating power; the larger the value the better 
the discriminating power of the function. The Wilks’ Lambda provides a basis 
for verifying the statistical significance of this function. With a range of 
between zero and one, a value closer to zero denotes a high level  of 
discriminating power. Both the Chi-square and F-statistic indicate the way in 
which the independent variables differentiate significantly between groups 
(ie: potential adopters vs non-adopters), with a high value indicating a high 
level of significance. The canonical correlation is a measure of the degree of 
association between the discriminant scores and group membership.  With a 
range of between zero and one, a value closer to one denotes a good predictive 
model. The explanatory power of a discriminant function can also be gauged 
by comparing its classification of sample cases with actual group membership. 
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Analysis refers to the interpretation of the original data, and to the 
interpretation of the discriminant function. The F-test can be used to check 
whether or not the individual discriminating variables contribute to the 
separation of groups (potential adopters and non-adopters). This test is valid 
only if the explanatory variables are multivariate normally distributed (Truett 
et al, 1967:521). According to Klecka (1980:61), the assumption of a 
multivariate normal distribution (normality assumption) is important for tests 
of significance. In these tests, a statistical computed from a sample is being 
compared to a theoretical probability distribution for that statistic. A 
theoretical distribution can be computed by making some convenient 
mathematical assumptions, such as requiring that the population meet the 
normality assumption. If the sample population does not satisfy this 
requirement, the true sampling distribution for the statistic will be different 
from the theoretically derived distribution. The difference between the two 
distributions may be very small or very large, depending on the degree of 
deviation from the assumption. 
 
The normality assumption is violated in the study by the dichotomous nature 
of the independent variables. In practice, however, discriminant analysis is a 
rather robust which can tolerate some deviation from the normality 
assumption. Violation of the assumption does not render the analysis useless. 
Lachenbruch (1975:40-50) reviewed numerous discriminant studies and 
showed that the discriminant function performs fairly well on such non-normal 
data. In practice, this assumption can also be checked by observing the 
distribution of the discriminant scores (Di) estimated for each group. If the 
distribution is approximately normal, the test is considered valid. According to 
Klecka (1980:62), in the interest of developing a mathematical model which can 
predict well or serve as a reasonable description of the real world, the best 
guide is the percentage of correct classifications. If this percentage is high, the 
violation of any assumption was not very harmful. Efforts to improve the data 
or use alternative formulas can give only marginal improvements. 
 
3.2.2 Variables  considered  and  hypotheses 
 
The variables that were expected to distinguish potential IED scheme adopters 
from non-adopters are presented in Table 5 and discussed in this section. A 
dependent variable Y_N was constructed using (1) for farmers for whom the 
consultant would recommend investing in an IED scheme and (0) for farmers 
he would not recommend investing in an IED scheme. 
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Table 5:  Definition of variables considered for discriminant analysis 
Variable Definition 
Y_N  = yes/no (1 for potential adopter; 0 for potential non-adopter) 
DA  = debt/asset ratio (dummy variable scoring 1 for high; 0 for low) 
OI  = off-farm income (dummy variable scoring 1 for high; 0 for low) 
NFI  = net farm income (dummy variable scoring 1 for high; 0 for low) 
RISK  = index of variation in net farm income (dummy variable scoring 2.630 for high; 0.523 for low) 
ENT  = enterprise (dummy variable scoring 1 for livestock farmer; 0 for maize farmer) 
R_DA  = index of variation in net farm income multiplied by debt/asset ratio (interaction variable) 
 
Independent variables with their expected signs were as follows: 
i)  Debt/asset ratio (-). This ratio was used as a measure of solvency. The 
critical issue relating to leverage is the farm’s ability to generate the cash 
to meet all expenses and service the debt with an acceptable margin of 
safety. Due to the cost of borrowing being higher than the interest rate 
earned on investing in an IED, it was expected that farmers with debt 
would redeem debt first before investing in an IED scheme. 
ii)  Off-farm income (-). The off-farm income of a farming business serves 
as an additional source of funds, which can be used in the farming 
operation or invested outside of agriculture. It was hypothesised that 
higher levels of off-farm income may indicate clients that have 
diversified investments and so would be less likely to need an IED. It 
was also hoped that farmers with relatively higher off-farm incomes 
would not use the scheme as a perceived tax shelter.  
iii)  Net farm income (+). The net farm income of a farm business is a 
reflection of how well the business has performed. According to Barry 
et al (1995), the level of net farm income reflected in the income 
statement is a meaningful absolute measure with which to monitor 
profitability of the business from year to year. It was postulated that 
adopters would have higher net farm incomes (higher profits) as they 
would have the means to save.  
iv)  Index of variation in net farm income (+). This variable reflects the 
business risk inherent in a particular enterprise. It was hypothesised 
that an IED scheme would suite farms having a higher index of 
variation in net farm income variability as they are exposed to more 
business risk. The introduction of an IED scheme is primarily as a risk 
management tool and it is therefore expected that farmers with a 
higher variation in income will make more use of such a scheme. The 
conventional dummy variable scoring (1; 0) was weighted using a 
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coefficient of variation which provided a score of 2.630 for a high index 
of variation in net farm income and a score of 0.523 for a farmer with a 
low index of variation in net farm income.  
v)  Enterprise (+). This variable was considered to capture the effects of 
relatively lower risk livestock farmers (less variable net farm incomes) 
compared to relatively high risk maize farmers (more variable net 
farm incomes). It was postulated that both livestock and maize farmers 
would adopt an IED scheme, with the scheme being more valuable to 
the higher risk maize farmers. Due to the design of the scenarios 
(maize farmers-high net farm income variability, livestock farmers-low 
net farm income variability), the business risk experienced by maize 
and livestock farmers is captured in both the ENT and RISK variable. 
As a result of this relationship, perfect multicollinearity was expected 
between these two variables.  
vi)  Risk - debt/asset ratio. This variable was constructed to determine 
what the combined effects of risk and debt/asset ratio would have on 
the potential use of an IED scheme. The relationship between the 
interaction effect R_DA and an IED scheme was not clear and for this 
reason no hypotheses were presented. Farmers with a high 
combination of risk and debt may be advised to first reduce their debt 
before investing in an IED scheme. This situation would imply a 
negative relationship between the variable and an IED scheme. 
However, a high debt/asset ratio (financial risk) coupled with a high 
variation in net farm income (business risk) would increase a farmer’s 
total risk. In this situation, a consultant may advise the client to invest 
in an IED scheme thus implying a positive relationship.  
Due to the nature of the multiplicative term, multicollinearity was anticipated 
between the variable R_DA and its component variables RISK and DA. The 
next section provides a brief background to the problems associated with the use 
of multiplicative terms and how the multicollinearity problem was addressed. 
 
3.3 Multicollinearity  issues 
The use of multiplicative terms in discriminant analysis focuses on the issue of 
multicollinearity. Critics have noted that multiplicative terms usually exhibit 
strong correlations with the component parts. Because multiplicative terms 
can introduce high levels of multicollinearity, critics have often recommended 
against their use (Jaccard et al, 1990:30). According to Gujarati (1999), in cases 
of perfect and high multicollinearity, estimation and hypothesis testing about 
individual discriminant coefficients in a multiple regression are not possible.  
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The partial correlation coefficient technique is commonly used in quantifying 
the strength of association between two variables. By using this technique, 
multicollinearity between two variables can successfully be detected and 
preliminary results can be extracted. Table 6 presents the partial correlations 
between main and interaction variables.  The enterprise variable (ENT) was 
retained to determine its relationship with the index of variation in net farm 
income variable (RISK). 
 
Table 6:  Partial correlation matrix using standardised variables, sample of 
SA consultants, 2000 (n=192) 
  ENT  DA  OI  NFI  RISK  E_DA  R_DA  Y_N 
ENT  1.000         
DA  0.266*  1.000        
OI  0.022  -0.033  1.000       
NFI  -0.225  0.339*  0.028  1.000      
RISK  1.000  0.266*  0.022  -0.225  1.000     
E_DA  0.673* 0.621*  -0.005  0.055  0.673*  1.000    
R_DA  0.673* 0.621*  -0.005  0.055  0.673*  1.000*  1.000  
Y_N  0.388* -0.535*  -0.052 0.472*  0.388*  -0.103  -0.103 1.000 
Note:  *Signifies statistical significance at the 1% level of probability. 
 
From Table 6 it is clear that multicollinearity exists between the interaction 
variable R_DA and its component variables RISK and DA, with coefficients 
of 0.621 and 0.673 respectively. Cronbach (1987) suggested centring the 
independent variables, prior to forming the multiplicative term, as a means of 
addressing the problem of multicollinearity (as cited by Jaccard et al, 1990:31). 
Following this technique, the independent variable scores were centred (ie. 
deviation scores were formed) and the product of the centred scores was 
computed for each subject. Table 7 presents the partial correlations between 
main and interaction variables using centred scores. 
 
Table 7:  Partial  correlation matrix using centred scores, sample of SA 
consultants, 2000 (n=192) 
  ENT DA  OI  NFI  RISK  E_DA  R_DA  Y_N 
ENT  1.000          
DA  0.266* 1.000             
OI  0.022 -0.033  1.000           
NFI  -0.225 0.339*  0.028  1.000         
RISK  1.000* 0.266* 0.022  -0.225  1.000       
E_DA  0.013 -0.020 -0.002  0.017  0.013  1.000     
R_DA  0.013 -0.020 -0.002  0.017  0.013  1.000* 1.000   
Y_N  0.388* -0.535* -0.052  0.472*  0.388* -0.031  -0.031  1.00 
Note:  *Signifies statistical significance at the 1% level of probability. 




From Table 7 it is evident that the multicollinearity that existed between the 
multiplicative term R_DA and its component variables RISK and DA has been 
eliminated, with coefficients of 0.013 and -0.020 respectively. For the purpose of 
discrimiant analysis, non-centred scores were used to produce the results of the 
main effects model (Model 1) and centred scores were used to produce the 
results of the interaction model (Model 2). As anticipated, the variables RISK 
and ENT were perfectly correlated. The results obtained by substituting RISK 
for  ENT and vice versa in the subsequent discriminant analysis would 
therefore be consistent, allowing one variable to be excluded from the analyses. 
This would effectively remove the effects of perfect collinearity. The enterprise 
variable ENT was subsequently dropped and the index of variation in net farm 
income variable RISK was retained for analysis purposes. 
 
3.4 Preliminary  results 
 
Preliminary results can be extrapolated from the coefficients of variation 
calculated in Table 3 and the partial correlation matrix presented in Table 7. 
According to Barry et al (1995:31), the coefficient of variation serves as an 
indicator of the amount of risk relative to the amount of expected return. It is 
a measure of the amount of risk inherent in a particular venture or enterprise. 
The higher the value, the more risky the venture/enterprise. The coefficients 
of variation calculated from the original representative livestock, maize and 
diversified farm record data indicate that maize farmers carry more risk (high 
of 2.630, low of 1.453) relative to livestock farmers (high of 1.886, low of 0.523), 
with diversified farmers carrying the least risk (0.303). It is worth noting that a 
maize farmer with an intermediate value (1.963) is above a livestock farmer 
with a high value (1.886). These results indicate the relative proportions of risk 
maize farmers experience relative to livestock and diversified farmers, making 
the scheme more valuable to maize farmers relative to livestock and diversified 
farmers. 
 
The correlation coefficients for Y_N  with  DA,  NFI and RISK were all 
statistically significant at the 1% level of probability, while the coefficient for 
OI and R_DA was not statistically significant. The signs of the coefficients all 
agree with a priori reasoning. The relative contribution of the DA  variable 
overshadows the relative contribution of the RISK  variable, resulting in a 
negative coefficient of the interactive term R_DA. The non-significant sign of 
the coefficient indicates that, ceteris paribus, the study consultants would 
advise farmers to first reduce their debt before investing in an IED scheme. In 
the study consultants’ view, farmers with less leverage (debt/asset ratio), 
higher net farm incomes and more variable net farm incomes are more likely 
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to use an IED scheme. The relative size of the explanatory coefficient estimates 
indicate that statistically, DA is the most important determinant of an IED 
scheme, followed by NFI and then RISK. An in-depth look at the research 




This section presents the results obtained in discriminant analysis. Two 
models are presented in the discriminant analysis section, followed by a brief 
discussion on the results obtained. The discriminant function obtained 
separating potential users and non-users of an IED scheme is then presented 
and used to predict the potential membership of specific cases (samples) 
selected from the original data set. These results are then tabulated and briefly 
discussed. The section ends with an assessment of the discriminant analysis 
due to the violation of the normality assumption. 
 
4.1 Discriminant  analysis  results 
 
4.1.1  Discrimination between potential adopters and non-adopters of an IED scheme 
 
All 24 tax consultants perceived the nine farm scenarios considered to be 
realistic, implying that their views were a good representation of what they 
would advise their clients. This, together with a consistency rate of 91% 
achieved through the control scenario, ensured a realistic and consistent data 
set for analysis purposes. Two discriminant models are presented in Table 8. 
Model 1 consists of the main effects and Model 2 consists of the main effects 
with the interaction effect. 
 
The overall Chi-square value (significant at the 1% level of probability) in both 
models indicates that, collectively, the explanatory variables in each model 
distinguish significantly between potential adopters and non-adopters of an 
IED scheme. The Wilks’ Lambda in both models indicates a high level of 
discriminating power. In addition, the Eigenvalue (ratio of between-groups to 
within-groups sum of squares) and the Canonical correlation  (measure of 
degree of association between the discriminant scores and group membership) 
indicate good predictive models. Both models correctly classified 94% of overall 
cases. Due to the restrictions imposed by the statistical model, no holdout 
sample was used in determining classification rates.  
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Table 8:  Results of the discriminant models identifying the characteristics 
of potential adopters and non-adopters of an IED scheme, sample 
of SA consultants, 2000 (n=192) 
  Model 1  Model 2 
Explanatory variables  Standardised coefficient 
DA -0.955*  -0.956* 
NFI 0.879*  0.880* 
RISK 0.756*  0.756* 
OI -0.111  -0.111 
R_DA   -0.067 
Discriminant function statistics  Statistic 
Chi-square 203.871*  203.878* 
Wilks’ Lambda  0.338  0.338 
Canonical correlation  0.814  0.814 
Eigenvalue 1.958  1.966 








% Correctly classified  100.0  89.7  100.0  89.7 
Overall % correctly classified  94.3  94.3 
Note:  *Signifies statistical significance at the 1% level of probability. 
 
The relationships (coefficient signs) between dependent and independent 
variables were in accordance with a priori expectations and supported the 
preliminary results obtained from the partial correlation matrix in Chapter 3. 
In Model 1, the debt/asset ratio (DA) was found to be the most important 
variable (highest standardised coefficient) distinguishing between potential 
adopters and non-adopters of an IED scheme. The negative sign of the 
variable indicates that, ceteris paribus, farmers with lower debt/asset ratios are 
more likely to make use of an IED scheme.  Farmers with a high debt/asset 
ratio will most likely be advised to reduce their debt before investing in an 
IED scheme. It is in any case a recommended strategy that farmers with high 
debt first repay their debt. The second most important distinguishing variable 
was net farm income (NFI). The sign was positive which confirms that, ceteris 
paribus, farmers with higher annual net farm incomes are more likely to invest 
in an IED scheme. Farmers with a high net farm income are more likely to 
have the resources to firstly, cover any existing debt, and then invest in an IED 
scheme. This supports the view expressed by Hattingh (1986:22) that 
wealthier farmers are more likely to make use of an IED scheme. 
 
The third most important variable was that of the index of variation in net 
farm income (RISK). The sign was positive indicating that, ceteris paribus, 
maize farmers with a high variation in net farm income are more likely to 
invest in an IED scheme than livestock farmers with a low variation in net 
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farm income. This indicates that an IED scheme could act as a potential risk 
management strategy. The fourth distinguishing variable listed was that of 
off-farm income (OI). Even though the standardised coefficient was found to 
be non-significant, it was retained in the model as the sign of the coefficient 
and its magnitude are of significance to the adoption of an IED scheme. The 
non-significant coefficient estimate indicates that, ceteris paribus, off-farm 
income will most likely not be invested in an IED. This implies there are no 
gains to be made in the misuse of the scheme as a tax shelter. Alternative 
investment avenues outside agriculture (diversified investments) could be a 
use of off-farm income where more gains could be made to provide the farmer 
with better risk spreading. 
In Model 2, the interaction variable was tested with the main variables. The 
main variables were all in accordance with the results obtained in Model 1. The 
standardised coefficient of the interaction variable (R_DA) was found to be 
non-significant but retained in the model to reveal its contribution to the 
decision to adopt an IED scheme. The relative contribution of the debt variable 
(DA) overshadows the relative contribution of the net farm income variability 
variable  (RISK), forcing the sign to be negative. The negative sign of the 
variable indicates that, ceteris paribus, maize farmers with a high index of 
variation in net farm income carrying high debt are less likely to invest in an 
IED. In the consultants’ views, high variability in net farm income (business 
risk) coupled with high debt (financial risk) may increase a farmer’s total risk 
but the farmer should first redeem the debt before investing in an IED. 
The discriminant function, obtained from Model 1, using unstandardised 
coefficients that separate potential users and non-users of an IED scheme is 
presented below.  
Di = - 0.978 - 2.249DA + 1.984NFI + 0.774RISK - 0.22OI  (2) 
I n  M o d e l  1 ,  h i g h  r i s k  m a i z e  f a r m e r s (high index of net farm income 
variability) were compared to low risk livestock farmers (low index of net 
farm income variability). The coefficients of variation for seven farming types 
were calculated from the actual data obtained from the Department of 
Agriculture (NDA, 2000) and presented to consultants. The following farming 
types were selected for different risk classes (high, intermediate and low): 
maize, livestock and diversified (one class) (see Table 9). By substituting the 
coefficients of variation for the RISK variable in the discriminant function, all 
possible combinations of net farm income variability with farming type could 
be exploited. Specific samples from the scenario data set were selected 
depicting different combinations and levels of the explanatory variables. With 
the use of the discriminant function, the potential membership of a specific 
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case (sample) could be predicted based on the discriminant score. The off-
farm income variable (OI) in Model 1 was statistically non-significant and was 
therefore retained with a low score (0) as it had no influence on the outcome 
of the discriminant scores. Additionally, as the interaction effect in Model 2 
was also statistically non-significant, no predictions are presented for Model 2. 
Table 9 presents selected samples with their respective discriminant scores 
(Di). The group centroids were -1.241 and 1.562 for potential non-adopters and 
adopters respectively, yielding a cutoff point of 0.161. A sample case yielding 
a discriminant score of less than 0.161 would be classified as a potential non-
adopter (N) and a discriminant score of greater than 0.161 would be classified 
as a potential adopter (Y). 
Table  9:  Predicted membership of specific samples, as selected from a 




D_A OI NFI  RISK Di  Y_N 
MH  0 0 1  2.630  3.042  Y 
MI  0 0 1  1.963  2.525  Y 
LH  0 0 1  1.886  2.466  Y 
ML  0 0 1  1.453  2.131  Y 
LI  0 0 1  0.947  1.739  Y 









D  0 0 1  0.303  1.241  Y 
MH  0 0 0  2.630  1.058  Y 
MI  0 0 0  1.963  0.542  Y 
LH  0 0 0  1.886  0.482  Y 
ML  0 0 0  1.453  0.147  N 
LI  0 0 0  0.947  -0.245  N 









D  0 0 0  0.303  -0.743  N 
MH  1 0 1  2.630  0.793  Y 
MI  1 0 1  1.963  0.276  Y 
LH  1 0 1  1.886  0.217  Y 
ML  1 0 1  1.453  -0.118  N 
LI  1 0 1  0.947  -0.510  N 









D  1 0 1  0.303  -1.008  N 
MH  1 0 0  2.630  -1.191  N 
MI  1 0 0  1.963  -1.708  N 
LH  1 0 0  1.886  -1.767  N 
ML  1 0 0  1.453  -2.102  N 
LI  1 0 0  0.947  -2.494  N 









D  1 0 0  0.303  -2.992  N 
Note:  MH = maize high risk  LH  = livestock high risk 
  MI  = maize intermediate risk  LI  = livestock intermediate risk 
  ML  = maize low risk  LL  = livestock low risk 
 D  =  diversified 
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In Block 1 of Table 9, various levels of net farm income variability (risk) are 
depicted with a high level of net farm income, holding the remaining 
variables constant at low levels. The discriminant scores (Di) suggest that all 
these types of farmers will most likely make use of an IED scheme. Farmers 
carrying little debt with a high net farm income have the resources to make 
use of the scheme. The relative size of the discriminant scores indicates which 
farmer would most likely make use of the scheme relative to other farmers. 
According to the results, more value is given to high risk maize farmers, 
followed by intermediate risk maize farmers and then high-risk livestock 
farmers. Least value is given to diversified farmers. This ranking was 
expected, as farmers facing more business risk are more likely to invest in an 
IED scheme. 
 
Block 2 depicts farmers with various levels of net farm income variability, 
holding the remaining variables constant at low levels. The discriminant 
scores revealed that only high and intermediate risk maize farmers, and high-
risk livestock farmers would most likely invest in an IED scheme. The risk 
associated with maize farmers carrying low levels of net farm income 
variability, livestock farmers carrying intermediate and low levels of net farm 
income variability, and diversified farmers is not sufficient to justify the use of 
an IED scheme. This again supports the use of an IED scheme as a risk 
management tool as higher risk farmers are more likely to make use of the 
scheme. 
 
In Block 3, farmers with various levels of net farm income variability are 
depicted with a high level of net farm income and debt. According to the 
discriminant scores, the only likely users of an IED scheme under these 
conditions are high and intermediate risk maize farmers, and high-risk 
livestock farmers. The positive effect of the net farm income and risk variable 
offsets the negative effect of the debt/asset variable in these particular 
samples. In the remaining samples, the combined effect of the risk and net 
farm income variable is too low to offset the debt/asset variable. Block 4 
depicts farmers with various levels of net farm income variability with a high 
level of debt, holding the remaining variables constant at a low level. The 
discriminant scores suggest that all the farmers depicted will most likely not 
make use of an IED scheme. The negative effect of the debt/asset variable 
offsets the positive effect of the risk variable. 
 
The results indicate that maize, livestock and diversified farmers carrying large 
amounts of debt (>40%) are less likely to invest in an IED scheme. Amongst the 
high debt farmers, only high and intermediate risk maize farmers, and high risk 
livestock farmers are most likely to make use of an IED scheme. The relative 
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contribution of the debt variable in the analyses indicates the importance of this 
variable in distinguishing between potential adopters and non-adopters of an 
IED scheme. Several studies revealed the leverage (debt/asset) ratio to be the 
most important determinant of maize farm bankruptcies between 1970 and 
1994 (Leslie & Darroch, 1993; De Jager & Swanepoel, 1994; Swanepoel et al, 
1996). A later study by Swanepoel et al (1998) indicated that the leverage ratio 
was the most important determinant of extensive beef farm bankruptcies over 
the same period (1970 to 1994). From these studies, it is evident that profits and 
cash flow could be of concern in the key livestock and crop sectors of South 
Africa. The extent of this problem in the grain sector has been addressed in a 
recent study where the financial position of the Northern and Southern grain 
regions of South Africa was reviewed by Du Toit (2001). It was reported that 
since 1998, 694 farmers in these regions have been sequestrated, with a further 
271 farmers being sequestrated in 2001. Another study conducted by 
Esterhuizen  et al (2001) revealed the financial position of the agricultural 
business sector. Bankruptcies almost doubled (0.4% in 1998 to 0.74% in 2000), 
59% more loans have been rejected by agribusinesses since 1998, the debt 
recovery account has grown by 22%, clients against whom action was taken 
increased by 63% with money involved increasing by 255%, new entrants 
securing loans increased by 9% and the money involved in new loans increased 
by 99%, indicating that more agricultural producers are dependant on loans. 
Unfavourable and fluctuating climatic conditions, primarily in the summer 
crop areas of South Africa, were identified as possible causes of this situation. 
 
4.2  Assessment of the discriminant analysis results 
 
Since the multivariate normality assumption was violated by the dichotomous 
nature of the independent variables, the discriminant scores for the main 
effects model and interaction model were estimated and presented using 
frequency tables and histograms. The discriminant scores estimated for the 
main effects potential non-adopter model and the interaction potential non-
adopter model appeared to be approximately normally distributed, while the 
scores for the main effects potential adopter model and the interaction 
potential adopter model were slightly positively skewed. In combination, the 
discriminant scores for potential adopter and non-adopter groups appear to 
be approximately normally distributed, thus, according to Lachenbruch 
(1975), rendering the test valid. The estimates can thus be accepted with 
reasonable confidence. A classification rate of 100% for potential adopters and 
89.7% for potential non-adopters in both models, according to Klecka (1980), 
indicates that the violation of the normality assumption was not very harmful, 
thus suggesting that good predictive models were developed. 
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5.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Discriminant analysis supported the preliminary results, confirming that, in 
the study consultants’ view, farmers with less leverage (debt/asset ratios in 
the 15%-30% range), higher net farm incomes (>R300,000), and more variable 
net farm incomes, are more likely to invest in an IED scheme. The significance 
of these variables indicates the value of an IED scheme as a risk management 
tool, with the debt/asset ratio being the primary indicator when considering 
investing in such a scheme. Amongst the high debt farmers, high and 
intermediate risk maize farmers, and high-risk livestock farmers are most 
likely to make use of an IED scheme. Study data showed that maize farmers 
faced relatively more business risk than did livestock and diversified farmers, 
suggesting that maize farmers may more readily invest in an IED scheme. 
Since maize farmers have been the main beneficiaries of past government 
drought aid, this could mean reduced demands on government drought relief 
funds in future if an IED scheme is introduced. 
 
The tax provisions available to commercial farmers can help reduce the 
impact of disasters  on farm income, assist with abnormal receipts of farm 
income, assist in the purchasing of capital items which are extremely costly, 
and reduce the tax liability of livestock on hand, however, they do not provide 
an incentive for farmers to become more liquid and better prepared to handle 
risk. An IED scheme can be used to manage volatility at the total profit level, 
which is largely weather related, by providing an incentive for farmers to 
become more liquid and better prepared to handle risk. An IED scheme can 
potentially form an effective part of a risk management strategy, especially if 
it is used in conjunction with other strategies. 
 
Results from the studies conducted on the causes of maize and extensive beef 
farm bankruptcies, and on the financial position of the Northern and Southern 
grain regions, suggest there may be an increase in debt in these sectors, but it 
is uncertain as to the extent of the problem. Bankruptcies and sequestrations 
could merely reflect inefficient farmers leaving the agricultural sector or, 
alternatively, the need for an alternative risk management tool. Farmers 
carrying large amounts of debt do not necessarily have profit or cash flow 
problems, as the returns on debt may be higher than the cost of debt. These 
farmers are, however, more prone to cash flow problems. What the results do 
indicate is that debt is concentrated in certain areas where cash flow may be a 
problem, and these areas appear to be predominantly in the high risk maize 
and livestock regions of South Africa. According to the results of the current 
study, it is these potentially high risk farmers (highly leveraged and high 
income variability) that need to make use of an IED scheme. In the short run, 
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highly leveraged farmers with cash flow problems will most likely not be able 
to participate in an IED scheme. Consultants need to advise clients on the 
relationship between net farm income, interest costs and leverage levels for 
successful debt management. Only then can these farmers invest in an IED 
scheme, which can help manage the effects of a changing agricultural and 
macroeconomic policy environment. 
 
Results from the discriminant analysis provided information regarding certain 
major criticisms of an IED scheme. Results from discriminant analysis 
indicated that farmers with various levels of income variability and a high 
level of net farm income, holding the remaining variables constant at low 
levels, would most likely make use of an IED scheme. Irrespective of the 
income variability (risk) of a farmer, the model predicted that all farmers in 
the study would most likely invest in an IED scheme. When various levels of 
farm income variability were depicted with the remaining variable held 
constant at low levels, only three of the seven farmers depicted would invest 
in an IED scheme. This supports the criticism that an IED scheme will favour 
farmers with high net farm incomes. 
 
The non-significance of the off-farm income coefficient in the discriminant 
analysis indicates that off-farm income will most likely not be invested in an 
IED. This suggests that there are no gains to be made in the misuse of the 
scheme as a tax shelter. This finding does not support the criticism that an IED 
scheme offers considerable scope for tax sheltering in respect of depositing 
off-farm income into IED’s. 
 
Practicing consultants have provided valuable information regarding the 
viability of an IED scheme for commercial farmers in South Africa and the 
results have provided some information on the criticisms of such a scheme in 
the past. An area of future research could involve determining where the debt 
is predominantly concentrated in the commercial livestock and crop sectors of 
South Africa, whether cash flow is a problem in these areas, and the extent to 
which these farmers can make use of an IED scheme. This could give more 
scope as to the potential short run use of an IED scheme. Additional research 
could be to look at the possibility of commercial banks offering IED facilities. 
This could reduce administration costs for the Land Bank, and may encourage 
more IED use as farmers would have more choice as to where they invest. 
Lastly, a comprehensive evaluation of the Australian FMD scheme should be 
made as this scheme has been successfully implemented with little financial 
support from the government and could serve as a possible guideline to the 
implementation of an IED scheme in South Africa. 
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